

MIST Trustees have accepted the SSRA Report and MIST has agreed to implement the recommendations in the Report.



Methodist Independent Schools: Safeguarding Review and Audit (SSRA)

SSRA Project Board Report (Summary) - April 2017





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An electronic copy of this Report is available on request from MIST

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
Abigail Clay (Auditor)

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Methodist Independent Schools

1. Rydal Penrhos School (Wales)
2. Woodhouse Grove School (with Brontë House)
3. Ashville College
4. Moorlands School
5. St Faiths School (not included in SSRA)
6. The Leys School
7. Culford School
8. Queenswood School
9. Farringtons School
10. Kent College Canterbury
11. Kent College Pembury
12. Lorenden Preparatory School
13. Kingswood School
14. Queen's College Taunton
15. Kingsley School Bideford
16. Shebbear College
17. St Petroc's School
18. Truro School
19. Truro High School



SSRA PROJECT BOARD REPORT SUMMARY

1. Background

- 1.1 In May 2015, the Methodist Church published *Courage, Cost and Hope* the report on the Past Cases Review (PCR) conducted between 2012/2015. The review explored the Church's handling of abuse cases dating back to 1950. The report was accepted by the Methodist Conference in 2015 and implementation of the recommendations is now in progress.
- 1.2 The Methodist Independent Schools Trust's (MIST) response to the PCR was a determination to consider seriously how a similar process could be adopted within the independent schools group and in addition develop a process that would strengthen current safeguarding arrangements in the schools. It was agreed to run two parallel processes, a non-recent cases review and an audit to assess the current safeguarding practice.
- 1.3 The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) was established in July 2015 and early on it agreed that boarding schools would be one of the first twelve areas of investigation. The Chair of the Inquiry released a statement encouraging schools to take a proactive approach, to review their files, records and procedures voluntarily and to take the initiative to self-report instances of institutional failure. It also stressed the need to review current safeguarding policies to make sure they are consistent with best practice and take whatever steps are required to provide a safe environment for children now. One strand of the Inquiry is the Truth Project which is established to hear the voices of survivors. In light of this it was agreed that the SSRA should not involve approaching survivors.
- 1.4 In March 2016 MIST appointed an independent Project Board to oversee the review and audit process. The Board was chaired by Jane Stacey; the audit team was led by Carolyn Eyre. Other Board members included Tim Carter (Safeguarding Adviser to the Methodist Church), a specialist adviser on Child Protection (Marcus Erooga), a Chair of Governors, a Head and MIST's safeguarding Trustee (Barbara Easton). Audit team members included people with extensive experience of child protection, safeguarding and school inspection (ISI, OFSTED and Children's Services). The Project Board consulted with and was advised by Maria Strauss from Farrer & Co throughout the SSRA Project.


2. Process

- 2.1 The Board initially agreed the arrangements for the audit and review pilot and how reports would be made to the Board. In June 2016 the Board received the report on the pilot visits and as a result changes were made to the non-recent cases review documentation. Further reports on the progress of the review and audit were made in August and October with draft reports presented to the Board in November 2016.
- 2.2 The full report was published to MIST Trustees and schools in early February and key aspects of the report presented to Heads, Chairs of Governors and Trustees at a Training Day held at the offices of Farrer & Co on 9 February 2017.

3. Audit of Current Child Protection and Safeguarding Arrangements in Schools

3.1 The work of the audit team has been impressive and MIST has benefited from the breadth of experience and knowledge they brought to the process. The audit tool used by the team was structured in line with the Department for Education Guidance *Keeping Children Safe in Education* (KCSiE). The key areas that were examined were: Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL); Site and Security; a Safeguarding Ethos; Child Protection and Safeguarding Training; Nominated or Named Governor; Policies and Procedures; Safer Recruitment; Other Services. Under these headings were sixty criteria that were assessed during the audit, each of which was allocated a red, amber or green rating (RAG). The summary chart included below captures the overall picture obtained from the audit.

The chart is a summary of results by themed area across all eighteen schools:



3.2 The chart shows that overall there is a strong platform of performance on which to build. The audit report highlighted many areas of good practice and also areas in which MIST and/or the schools can work together to support better practice.

4. Non - Recent Cases Review

4.1 The non-recent cases review was a separate process to the audit but carried out in parallel. The first stage of this review was for schools to provide information on the state of the school’s records, including how they are stored and if there have been any particular issues around records being damaged or destroyed. They were also asked to provide information on the process used to search through the records. Finally, they needed to explain how the identified non-recent cases were reviewed.

4.2 During their visits the auditors discussed with the Head the process used by each school to identify non-recent cases and in several cases made additional suggestions which are now being followed up. When this process is completed it is reasonable to assume that the information that would be required by IICSA is as available as it is possible to achieve. It is however impossible to make a judgement as to whether all non-recent cases have been identified. It is almost certain that some cases were unreported at the time and would therefore not be mentioned in records. Of those where records were made (and retained) it may be reasonable to assume the most serious have been identified.

4.3 Our review of non-recent cases indicated that the vast majority of serious allegations for which records exist were referred in line with whatever procedures were appropriate to the time

- 4.4 The second stage of the review was to assess whether further action should be taken in relation to any of the identified cases in accordance with current guidance and practice. This was discussed at the audit visit and in several cases contact with the Local Authority Designated Officer (LADO) was recommended.
- 4.5 In addition, all schools have had discussions with the auditor about learning from their individual follow up. There remains some further work to do in some schools on completing this process but wherever reporting non-recent cases to the LADO was recommended, this has been done.

5. Safeguarding Culture

- 5.1 It is difficult to overstate the significance of organisational culture to the overall experience of being a member of the school community, whether that is as a pupil, a parent, a staff member or a governor. When there is a positive culture, and what is achieved is a positive, inclusive, mutually respectful and safeguarding aware organisation, the experience of being part of that organisation is a positive one and children are more likely to be appropriately safeguarded.
- 5.2 By contrast, the opposite is true, where there is the absence of appropriate infrastructure and culture of vigilance in both recruitment and ongoing supervision, they will also lack the processes and culture where whistleblowing is encouraged. In those instances the possibility of abuse or inappropriate behaviour being a feature of school life is increased. A significant number of recent inquiries into institutional child sexual abuse in the UK cited organisational culture as a key contributory factor, whilst a proportion of perpetrators interviewed as part of research into organisational abuse stated that the culture of the organisation in which they offended did not proactively promote child welfare.
- 5.3 The detailed findings of the audit give very important data to inform an assessment of how robust and embedded the safeguarding culture is within the schools. The auditors were greatly impressed by the overall commitment of staff and governors they met to ensuring there was a strong safeguarding ethos in the schools. They reported that in some aspects they saw practice better than they had observed in other (non MIST) settings. In terms of Personal, Social and Health Education (PSHE) many of the schools could already be described as operating to a gold standard (one of the aspirations identified by MIST at the start of this process). Once all the schools have completed their follow up actions there will be a strong foundation to continue the journey to excellence.
- 5.4 However, it cannot be stressed enough that it is easy to slip into complacency once a process like this has been completed with a satisfactory conclusion. The SSRA Board therefore wants to draw attention to two levels of accountability which it believes need to be strengthened to ensure progress is sustained:
- i. **The role of the Governing Body in relation to safeguarding, both in terms of general culture but also in relation to the detail and how they operate oversight is critical.** They need to function at a strategic level, not getting involved in operational matters but having sufficient knowledge of detail to carry out the scrutiny function. There are a number of audit recommendations relating to training and support for Governing Bodies and implementing these should be regarded as a priority. However, it will also be critical that MIST is assured that, once trained, the Governing Bodies are confident in operating in the required way and sustain this. This is not a reflection on the current state of governance but on the importance of robust and sustainable accountability.
 - ii. **Accountability at the level of the overall Trust and the Trust's support of schools in this area also need to be enhanced.** The framework for the annual report (ASR) on safeguarding to MIST by all the schools for which it is responsible should be reviewed to ensure that the findings of this process are adequately reflected. The report in Autumn 2017 will need to include a full account on the actions taken to turn red and amber ratings to green. It is recommended that there is an accountability check in relation to safeguarding governance on an annual basis for the next two year period, post the submission of the ASR. An annual visit by a safeguarding expert will be a valuable resource for schools to draw on. It is not proposed that the full audit is repeated, rather that there is a discussion in advance of the visit of how the school would best use the opportunity. It will be helpful to use this visit to check that the school has an awareness of the learning points from the non-recent cases review.

The SSRA Board made the following recommendations:

- (1) **MIST should adopt a more proactive leadership role around safeguarding within MIST schools. This will include implementing all eight recommendations from the audit report that make reference to MIST developing specific Trust wide policies/guidance or taking action to promote best practice across the schools.**
- (2) **MIST continues to develop the support it offers schools to enable them to implement all of the audit recommendations that relate to school level actions. In addition, it will disseminate the guidance relating to references and close relationships at work that have been written in response to issues raised from the audit visits.**
- (3) **MIST to ensure that the follow up process regarding non-recent cases is completed and that all schools are aware of lessons to be learnt.**
- (4) **MIST should strengthen its support and accountability processes in relation to the schools and safeguarding. In particular, it should: require all schools for which it is responsible to submit a report to MIST in Autumn 2017 that will evidence how red and amber ratings have been turned green; and organise an annual visit, for the next two years, by a child protection expert to each school where they have responsibility.**

This visit to be primarily focused on support but also to meet the Chair of Governors and the safeguarding governor to ensure that oversight of safeguarding at governance level is as robust as possible.

6. School Audits (main findings and recommendations)

- 6.1 The audit team members were all professionals experienced in child protection, school leadership and/or inspection. Visits were completed over two days by two audit team members with the exception of three Preparatory Schools where one auditor was deployed for one day. Prior to the visit schools were asked to complete a self-assessment form (SEF), rating themselves red, amber or green (RAG) in 60 areas with examples of the evidence they could provide to support their analysis.
- 6.2 In advance of the audit each school was also asked to provide key policies/procedures; in addition, the auditors viewed relevant safeguarding information available on the school websites. During the visits, auditors tested the school's own assessments through paper trails, observation and discussions with staff and pupils. Audit teams met many pupils formally: school prefects, buddies, new pupils, boarders and others with responsibilities, as well as informally at meal times. In addition, wherever possible, audit team members also met: the designated safeguarding lead (DSL) and deputies; curriculum leaders such as for PSHE, SMSC (Spiritual, Moral, Social, Cultural Values), ICT; staff members with responsibility for Boarding, 6th form, EYFS (Early Years Foundation Stage) etc; site managers and IT infrastructure/network managers; the Prevent lead (Preventing radicalisation and extremism); medical centre staff/school nurse and, where available, the school counsellor and independent listener; safeguarding governor and/or Chair of Governors.
- 6.3 In some cases one member of staff held a number of the responsibility areas, DSLs are often the Prevent lead, for example. It was not always possible to meet with the independent listener or relevant governor. The audit teams met most but not all site managers during their visits.
- 6.4 Where an issue arose that could be resolved easily the school was given advice and support by the auditors as part of the visit. Individual auditors have provided additional resources on specific topics or re-visited schools to do additional work, in relation to safer recruitment for example. Outside the MIST SSRA project auditors have also been invited to deliver training to Governing Bodies in relation to modern governance models.

6.5 Key themes arising from the audit visits (summarised from the SSRA Audit Team Report):

1. Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSLs) and their Deputies

Most designated staff spoke highly of their Local Authority (LA) or Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB) training offer; it was pleasing to note that no MIST school is excluded from training programmes. Guidance on record keeping/retention, information sharing etc, appears to be notably lacking in some Local Authority courses. Records for individual pupils are generally well maintained. Practice is fairly equally divided between paper and electronic systems. In schools where a specific reporting form is used, whether electronic or paper, there is more likely to be some analysis of need and designated staff are better equipped to provide data for governor reports, etc. The benefits of installing a discrete online child protection system were discussed with designated staff and senior leaders during the audits; a key component of such systems being the reporting functions which would significantly enhance the Governing Body's ability to interrogate the effectiveness of their arrangements to safeguard children.

Supervision, a requirement in *Working Together to Safeguard Children (2015)*, is not well addressed by LA/LSCB training nationally so there are few opportunities for designated staff in MIST schools to understand how it can be used to improve outcomes for vulnerable children. Few if any designated staff were aware of LSCB protocols for raising concerns about the practice/responses of partner agencies; perhaps unsurprisingly this does not seem to be well covered in LA training and only a few of the designated staff the audit teams met were aware of and using the thresholds documents that all LAs must now publish.

DSLs were confident about seeking advice from specialist agencies where they are unsure whether to make a request for services. The audit teams' review of individual case files and discussion with designated staff indicates that there is a discrepancy between the point at which schools should make a referral to statutory agencies and the threshold at which those agencies will intervene. This is a national issue that has led to LSCBs being required to publish a thresholds document alongside a protocol for professional challenge/dispute. This requirement, in *Working Together to Safeguard Children (2015)*, is not well known by designated staff or other senior leaders in MIST schools who would benefit from knowing both documents in detail.

Recommendations (section 1)

- 1A. *The existing MIST guidance on record keeping and retention should be expanded to include individual child protection files and other safeguarding records.*
- 1B. *MIST should identify a suitable bespoke electronic child protection system and encourage schools to implement it.*
- 1C. *A supervision model should be adopted in all MIST schools – supported by an appropriate supervision policy and training. Where relevant, the supervision of Chaplains should be included.*
- 1D. *All designated staff should be aware of and, where necessary, use their LA/LSCB thresholds document and professional challenge/dispute protocol.*

2. Site Security/General Health & Safety of Pupils

A significant number of schools have public rights of way or sites split across public roads. In addition, most schools have lettings involving members of the public not related to the school coming on site to drop off or collect children or to take part in activities themselves. Site managers that the audit teams met were well aware of the presenting risks and had taken all reasonable steps to mitigate these.

Auditors noted that links are not always made between safeguarding responsibilities and the general health & safety of pupils; site staff are generally very aware of the risks and challenges of the buildings/grounds but are rarely consulted on safeguarding procedures. As discussed later in this report, it would be good practice to include operations and site staff in a wider safeguarding team to assess the full implications of relevant guidance and legislation.

MIST schools conduct large numbers of activities, visits and residential trips for pupils, including overseas. Although not all schools have a named educational visits coordinator (EVC) they all have systems in place for a senior leader to sign off/approve visits during the school day; boarder events are usually managed separately. Not all schools have a system for ensuring that governors are fully aware of the number and nature of trips being undertaken by pupils. Governors should be aware of all hazardous or overseas trips and best practice is for this responsibility to sit with one of the sub-committees, such as Health & Safety, or with the Chair of Governors.

Recommendations (section 2)

- 2A. *Schools that do not yet have lock-down procedures or systems in place to respond to serious threats (terrorism, kidnap or other) should seek advice from their local police or other relevant agency.*
- 2B. *EVCs/leads should read the Southbank International School serious case review executive summary report and review their trip arrangements accordingly.*
- 2C. *Relevant governors should be fully aware of the trips and visits undertaken by pupils, particularly where these are hazardous.*
- 2D. *Schools should implement EVOLVE, the national online educational visit management tool.*
- 2E. *Schools should implement robust risk assessment of school lettings.*

3. A Safeguarding Ethos

Auditors were impressed by the breadth of the Personal, Social and Health Education (PSHE), e-safety, Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural Development (SMSC) and anti-bullying curriculum in all schools. Pupils in all schools report that bullying is rare and incidents are dealt with quickly; most schools are seen as safe environments for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender young people to come out, and gay students that the audit teams met spoke warmly of the support they have received in school. Auditors met many different groups of pupils of all ages and almost without exception, they were able to tell the audit teams how they are taught to stay safe, especially online. Pupils identified mental health, body image, healthy relationships and study skills topics as particularly valuable.

School nurses and doctors make a significant contribution to the wellbeing of pupils, in some settings teaching part of the sex and relationships education (SRE) curriculum. Their ability to identify and respond to indicators of abuse and neglect, self-harm, eating disorders and other mental health indicators makes them an essential part of any safeguarding team.

Generally, auditors felt that most schools have the right balance between confidentiality and sharing enough information to enable staff to keep individual pupils safe. Efforts to keep children safe online tended to be most effective where the e-safety curriculum lead and IT network manager worked closely.

Policies, procedures and guidance are usually accessible to parents via the school website. Most schools provide specific support with online safety, with links to useful organisations, digital parenting magazines and others although no-one seemed to be aware of the DfE Parent Info website for schools to link to. Some schools offer advice and assistance to parents with setting parental controls on devices, for example. Although the schools had very different approaches to mobile phones in school, use of mobiles in boarding houses, curfew times and so on, each had a rationale for their approach.

Recommendations (section 3)

- 3A. *MIST should coordinate a group of school leads to develop best practice in relation to filtering and monitoring software.*
- 3B. *Best practice in schools develops where the e-safety lead and the IT network manager liaise closely with the DSL and each other.*

4. Child Protection Training and Understanding

Staff training modes of delivery differ across the schools. Some are able to access INSET provided by the LA. In other areas, DSLs are provided with 'approved' materials to deliver in-house. Some designated staff write their own materials and then underpin this content with recognised online packages.

All schools provide staff with copies of *Keeping Children Safe in Education* (KCSiE) Part 1; approaches to ensuring staff have understood the guidance were varied. There is an over-reliance on KCSiE Part 1; members of the senior leadership team (SLT) should also know their responsibilities in Parts 2 and 4, HR colleagues should refer to Part 3 in their day to day work, and so on.

The audit teams recommended to each school creating a safeguarding team, to include site staff, HR, school nurse, PSHE/SMSC coordinator, e-safety lead, IT network manager and similar, to be convened on a regular basis or when new guidance or legislation is issued. This safeguarding team should take a broader view of implications and necessary actions, increasing capacity to enable the designated staff to concentrate on child protection.

Child protection training for prefects and other pupils with responsibilities is well embedded in most if not all schools, usually delivered by the DSL in some depth to include dealing with disclosure, confidentiality, who to report concerns to and signs of abuse.

The audit team felt that there is insufficient training or awareness raising for senior staff and governors in relation to KCSiE Part 4, managing allegations against staff. Some Headteachers work very closely with their Local Authority Designated Officer (LADO) and report that these provide sound support and advice but the audit team found that in other cases there has been a tendency to 'keep it in house' and/or a lack of understanding of the statutory requirements and thresholds for referral to other bodies.

Governor training tends to be delivered in-house by the DSL although some governors complete online courses devised for the sector, e.g. from AGBIS or BSA. Generally though, in-house governor child protection training tends to cover the same content as staff induction, signs and indicators, dealing with disclosure rather than the strategic responsibilities of their role. This is of significant detriment to their effectiveness, as demonstrated under governance below. Subsequent to the SEF being circulated to schools, new statutory guidance KCSiE 2016 was published in September 2016 which refers to the need for Governing Bodies to "ensure that mechanisms are in place to enable staff to understand and discharge their role and responsibilities ...". This is a significant shift from the previous duty to "ensure staff read and understand ..." and training must equip governors to comply with the new guidance.

Recommendations (section 4)

- 4A. *Staff with specific responsibilities should make themselves aware of all relevant sections of statutory guidance.*
- 4B. *Each school should set up a safeguarding team with wider membership than the designated staff to ensure that the full implications of statutory guidance and legislation can be understood and actioned.*
- 4C. *Online training should always be supported by conversation/discussion opportunities to check understanding and engagement.*
- 4D. *Governor training must cover their strategic responsibilities rather than simply operational/practical matters.*

5. Policies and Procedures

The prevailing safeguarding and child protection concerns across the (MIST) schools are parental conflict, domestic violence, parental expectations and mental health issues. All senior schools report an increase in self-harm, eating disorders and/or anxiety, in some cases requiring referral to local child and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS). Most schools employ at least one counsellor, to which pupils may self-refer or are referred by pastoral staff, and one senior school without this resource is now looking to provide it. A number of schools have staff trained in Mental Health First Aid (MHFA) and some also have accredited trainers on the staff.

The pastoral systems in MIST schools are impressive; most schools are meeting complex needs, particularly in relation to mental health, that in the past would have met thresholds for inter-agency intervention.

Some senior leaders perceive ISI compliance as more important than meeting their responsibilities as described in KCSiE. Similarly, there is sometimes an over-reliance on advice from lawyers in some schools, particularly in relation to developing child protection policy/procedure.

Keeping child protection policies up to date is a challenge for most schools. A tendency to simply add new sections has resulted in over-lengthy documents and a lack of clarity. Staff are not always clear about the difference between safeguarding and child protection so it is essential that policies explain the distinction.

Since the audit teams' visits, most schools have been able to update their whistleblowing policy to include confidential reporting of child protection issues and concerns about colleagues, particularly in relation to senior figures. In addition, MIST has circulated its own updated whistleblowing policy which should now be incorporated in school procedures.

Recommendations (section 5)

- 5A. *All schools should endeavour to have selected staff trained in Mental Health First Aid.*
- 5B. *Each school must have a whistleblowing policy that reflects the MIST whistleblowing arrangements and includes confidential reporting of safeguarding/child protection issues, MIST contacts and the NSPCC whistleblowing helpline.*
- 5C. *Prep and senior phases of all-through schools should not have separate policies; one common policy should include the specific adjustments needed.*
- 5D. *Child protection policies should acknowledge the different procedures needed for learners over the age of 18 and in the foundation stage, as appropriate.*

6. Governance of Safeguarding

Every school has a nominated safeguarding governor (not a requirement under current statutory guidance), and the most effective of these tend to have worked in the education sector or a similar field themselves. Where there is one or more nominated safeguarding governors, these are accountable to the whole Governing Body; all governors have responsibilities to ask relevant questions and to consider safeguarding in all aspects of governance. Strong safeguarding governors have a job description, understand the remit of their role and provide a structure for communication between the DSL (operational) and whole Governing Body (strategic). Individual schools should consider what is likely to be most effective in their particular circumstances; for some schools it may be preferable not to have the designation at all and to take a whole body responsibility or to have more than one governor nominated. The key criterion should be that effective safeguarding responsibilities are discharged.

Where governance is robust, there is evidence of safeguarding arrangements that are well resourced and staff that feel empowered. The difficulty appears to be more about a lack of good quality professional development (see 'training' above) and governors who are well intentioned but insufficiently challenging.

Recommendations (section 6)

- 6A. *MIST should support governors to discharge their safeguarding responsibilities fully.*
- 6B. *MIST should provide a framework to assist governors in having robust discussions with school leaders about how their safeguarding and child protection responsibilities are discharged.*
- 6C. *Where a Governing Body decides not to have a nominated safeguarding governor, the whole Governing Body is responsible for discharging all safeguarding functions.*
- 6D. *Where a Governing Body nominates a safeguarding governor, they should have a role profile which includes their accountability to the full Governing Body.*

7. Safer Recruitment Compliance

Every school has a 'safer recruitment' policy or procedure and a single central record (SCR) of the vetting checks undertaken. Most schools understood the statutory framework for safer recruitment (SR) and the importance of employing safer recruitment techniques. In some schools, however, staff with administrative responsibilities for recruitment and/or the SCR may not have completed safer recruitment training and are therefore less likely to understand the different checks needed or the importance of these.

Schools do not find it easy to keep up with frequent changes in vetting/recruitment legislation and few understood regulated activity properly.

The non-recent cases logs indicate that the use of agreed references had been common in some schools in the past although less so in recent times; it was felt that guidance on the effective use of references would therefore be helpful.

Recommendations (section 7)

- 7A. *MIST should consider providing a model safer recruitment policy/procedure, and application form for schools to benchmark against.*
- 7B. *MIST should develop a common approach to the giving and receipt of employment references and provide schools with additional guidance on overseas checks.*
- 7C. *All those with recruitment responsibilities (including the administration of the SCR) should attend safer recruitment training.*

8. General Observations and Issues not Covered Above

The audit team felt that children in Methodist Independent Schools are supported by committed staff within a caring pastoral system providing a rich menu of PSHE and other formal/informal curricula. Overall, the designated leads and their deputies are keen to 'do a good job' although there are many examples of silo working whereby the DSL becomes the 'expert' and deputies and other staff with responsibilities do not make a full contribution.

Statutory guidance, *Keeping Children Safe in Education*, was updated part way through the audit programme. As most schools had completed their self-assessment prior to publication, it was decided that to amend the assessment form might place an unreasonable burden on designated staff and senior leaders. However, the themes of the new guidance were discussed during all audits from September 2016 onwards.

Please note that the one Methodist school in Wales works to different regulations and guidance which made completion of the SEF difficult for them but also risks leaving the school isolated from the wider group of Methodist schools, all of which otherwise are subject to KCSiE.

Jane Stacey (SSRA Board Chair)

Carolyn Eyre (SSRA Audit Team Leader)

Glossary of Key Terms

AGBIS	Association of Governing Bodies of Independent Schools
ASR	Annual School Report, MIST
BSA	Boarding Schools' Association
CAMHS	Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services
DfE	Department for Education
DSL	Designated Safeguarding Lead
EVC	Education Visits Coordinator
EVOLVE	An online system for the planning, approval and management of educational visits, sports fixtures and extra-curricular activities.
EYFS	Early Years Foundation Stage
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IICSA	Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse
INSET	In-Service Education and Training
ISI	Independent Schools Inspectorate
KCSiE	Keeping Children Safe in Education
LA	Local Authority
LADO	Local Authority Designated Officer
LSCB	Local Safeguarding Children Board
MHFA	Mental Health First Aid
MIST	Methodist Independent Schools Trust
NSPCC	National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
PCR	Past Cases Review "Courage, Cost and Hope"
PSHE	Personal, Social and Health Education
RAG	Red, Amber, Green
SCR	Single Central Record
SEF	Self-Assessment Form
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SMSC	Spiritual, Moral, Social, Cultural Values
SR	Safer Recruitment
SRE	Sex and Relationships Education
SSRA	Safeguarding Review and Audit

SUMMARY OF SSRA AUDIT TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS

Responsibility	Recommendation	Action
MIST	<p>Existing MIST guidance on record-keeping and retention should be expanded to include explicit reference to child protection files and other safeguarding records.</p> <p>MIST (or each school) should identify a suitable bespoke electronic child protection system and implement this.</p> <p>A supervision model should be adopted in all schools, supported by an appropriate MIST-wide supervision policy and training.</p> <p>MIST should co-ordinate a group of school leads (ICT/e-safety) to develop best practice in relation to filtering and monitoring software.</p> <p>MIST should support Governing Bodies to discharge their safeguarding responsibilities fully.</p> <p>MIST should provide a framework to assist governors in having robust discussions with school leaders about how their safeguarding and child protection responsibilities are discharged.</p> <p>MIST should consider providing a model safer recruitment policy and application form for schools.</p> <p>MIST should develop a common approach giving and receiving references and provide additional guidance on overseas checks.</p>	<p>Gen Sec (Farrers)</p> <p>Schools</p> <p>Schools</p> <p>Gen Sec</p> <p>ASR and specialist advice</p> <p>Gov training</p> <p>HR WP</p> <p>HR WP</p>
Governors	<p>Relevant governors should be fully aware of trips and visits undertaken by pupils, especially where these are hazardous.</p> <p>Governor training must cover strategic responsibilities rather than simply operational/practical matters.</p> <p>Where a Governing Body decides not to have a nominated safeguarding governor, the whole Governing Body is responsible.</p> <p>Where a Governing Body nominates a safeguarding governor, they should have a role profile which includes accountability to the full Governing Body.</p>	<p>Schools</p> <p>Training</p> <p>Traning</p> <p>Schools</p>
Heads/SLT	<p>Schools that do not yet have lock-down procedures or systems in place to respond to serious threats (terrorism, kidnap or other) should seek advice from their local police or relevant agency.</p> <p>EVCs should read the Southbank International School serious case review executive summary and review their trip arrangements accordingly.</p> <p>Schools should implement EVOLVE, the national online educational visit management tool.</p> <p>Schools should implement risk assessments of school lettings.</p> <p>Staff with specific responsibilities should make themselves aware of relevant sections of statutory guidance.</p>	<p>Schools (police)</p> <p>EVCs</p> <p>Heads/EVCs SLT</p> <p>Heads/SLT</p>

SUMMARY OF SSRA AUDIT TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT)

Responsibility	Recommendation	Action
Heads/SLT (cont)	Each school should set up a safeguarding team with wider membership than the designated staff to ensure that the full implications of statutory guidance and legislation can be understood and actioned.	Heads/SLT
	Online training should always be supported by conversation/discussion to check understanding and engagement.	Heads/DSL
	All schools should endeavour to have selected staff trained in Mental Health First Aid.	Heads/SLT
	Each school should have a whistleblowing policy that reflects MIST's guidance and includes confidential reporting of safeguarding and child protection issues, MIST contacts and NSPCC helpline.	Heads/SLT
	Prep and senior phases of all-through schools should have one common policy (with specific adjustments as required by age/risk).	SLT
	Child protection policies should acknowledge different procedures for learners over the age of 18 and in EYFS.	SLT
	All those with recruitment responsibilities (including the administration of the SCR) should attend safer recruitment training.	SLT/HR
DSL	All designated staff should be aware of and, where necessary, use their LA/LCSB thresholds document and professional challenge/dispute protocol.	DSL
	All designated staff should attend MIST-wide meetings to share best practice (e.g. filtering and monitoring software).	DSL/MIST
	E-safety leads and IT network managers must liaise closely with the DSL and each other.	Safeguarding team



Methodist Independent Schools Trust
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